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I. 
The relationship between logic and ethics is one of the basic and most essential ques-
tions of classical philosophical analysis. Since the time of the Pythagoreans, the fundamen-
tal unity of the two – whether by means of vague intuition, an elaborate conceptual scheme, 
or even a carefully crafted lifestyle – has led philosophers to identify truth and virtue. In his 
critical philosophy Kant put this unity of truth and virtue to extensive and rigorous trial to 
determine what conditions, if any, allow us to intelligibly answer the question of how 
knowledge, or an obvious inner belief turns into a necessary motivation of the will, or, in 
other words, how belief can be interpreted as both an intelligible object and a source for 
action. In 1790 Kant gave his conclusive answer to this question in Critique of Judgment, 
which was an attempt to reconcile, in terms of aesthetics, a set of contradictions that arose 
between his 1st and 2nd Critiques, i.e. between his logical and ethical doctrines, to be dis-
cussed below.  
Although throughout the development of his thought Peirce made several decisive 
moves away from the mainstream of Kant’s first two Critiques, in his early years, Kant’s 
critical philosophy was the object of his steady interest. Besides, in Peirce’s case, Kantian 
influence was mediated and greatly diversified by intensive reading of Hegel and German 
Romantics, as well as by lessons in logic and mathematics from his father Benjamin Peirce 
(MS 310: 823; Colapietro 2006: 173-174, 196). This mediation greatly enriched Peirce’s 
perception of Kantian critical approach – to such an extent that much later, in his 1902 ap-
plication to Carnegie grant, Peirce avouched that “Kant’s criticism was, so to say, my 
mother’s milk in philosophy” (L 75). It is this beverage that made Peirce immune to the de-
ficiencies of empiricist tradition (Short 2007: 66-67, 81-83), especially with respect to his 
doctrine of categories (Friedman 1996). Moreover, mature Peirce, although he was highly 
critical towards Kant, praised him for the fact that he based metaphysics on logic, as well as 
for a decisive emphasis he laid on the idea of architectonics (Nordmann 2006; Parker 1998, 
2-59). Therefore, given the high complexity of Kantian themes in Peirce’s writings, what-
ever interpretation one may feel inclined to, it is widely recognized that Peirce’s pragma-
tism, both as a whole and in any particular stage of its development, may certainly not be 
adequately understood either as a plain repudiation of Kant or simply as a version of Neo-
Kantianism (Murphey 1968, Rosenthal 2002).  
However, an analysis of major strands of Kantian influence on Peirce, as well as an ex-
haustive account of the relationship between logic, ethics and aesthetics in Peirce’s pragma-
tism is beyond the purview of the present paper. Its principal aim is to display, against the 
highly complex background of this relationship, one curious way in which the very compo-
sition of Kant’s principal arguments in 1st and 2nd Critiques is reflected in some of Peirce’s 
early writings, and in his “On a New List of Categories” and “The Fixation of Belief” in 
particular. This compositional affinity deserves attention as it may serve two purposes. On 
the one hand, it shows how Kantian idea of architectonics revealed in the very structure of 
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his critical arguments is visible already in Peirce’s early texts; on the other hand, it helps to 
account for certain textual circumstances that accompanied Peirce’s first decisive step out 
of the mainstream of Kantian critical philosophy. 
As to the background in question, although the problem of the relationship between log-
ic and ethics stands out significantly in Peirce’s philosophy throughout all stages of its de-
velopment, it is only in the end of the 1890’s that Peirce first explicitly undertakes the task 
of systematically articulating his conception of ethics as a normative science. The case of 
aesthetics, which plays an important meditational role in Kant’s 3rd Critique, is even more 
intricate. In a draft to his fifth Harvard lecture (“The Three Normative Sciences”) delivered 
on 30 April 1903 in Sever Hall Peirce wrote: 
… although the first year of my study of philosophy was devoted to this branch exclu-
sively, yet I have since then so completely neglected it that I do not feel entitled to have 
any confident opinions about it. I’m inclined to think that there is such a normative sci-
ence; but I feel by no means sure even of that (EP2: 200). 
Later on, in the period of time between the reformulation of his maxim in 1903 and the 
proof of pragmatism in 1907 MS 318, Peirce had proposed a developed, even if somewhat 
sketchy view on aesthetics built in the framework of his architectonics. Incorporating aes-
thetics and establishing its priority over logic and ethics, Peirce’s architectonics finally 
connected his normative theory with his evolutionary metaphysics and doctrine of catego-
ries (Potter 1967: 3-71).  
Thus, on the one hand, there is a considerable gap in Peirce’s writings which in any way 
discuss or even simply touch the problem as stated by Kant, so that aesthetics and its role as 
a mediator between logic and ethics appears to be an apophasis for Peirce. On the other 
hand, it has been justly argued that on many occasions aesthetics can be considered as an 
unnamed undercurrent of Peirce’s thought, that it is often implicitly referred to by Peirce as 
the science which is “concerned with relationships and processes by which relations be-
tween Appearances and Reality, between Cognition and Idea, between Icon and Symbol … 
grow and evolve with respect of social values represented” (Kevelson 1994: 218).  
However, given Peirce’s early interest in Kant, and with due regard for the crucial role 
the relationship between logic and ethics played in Kant’s critical philosophy, Peirce could 
not have completely overlooked the solution Kant himself set forth in terms of aesthetic 
judgment in the 3rd Critique. Meanwhile, he never criticized this solution directly – with the 
exception of a few remarks on the fact that Kant and some other German thinkers “limit it 
<aesthetics> to taste, that is, to the action of the Spieltrieb from which deep and earnest 
emotion would seem to be excluded” (EP2: 378). In his 1906 “Basis of Pragmaticism in the 
Normative Sciences” Peirce defines aesthetics (or esthetics, as he preferred to call it) as a 
theory aimed at describing the deliberate formation of “a habit of feeling which has grown 
up under the influence of a course of self-criticisms and of hetero-criticisms” (EP2, 378). It 
has been suggested that Peirce paid little attention to the 3rd Critique due to his “fixation on 
logic” (Kaag 2005: 517; Anderson 1995: 21). However, being integrated by Kant in one 
architectonic whole, none of Kant’s three critical arguments can be properly understood in 
isolation from two others, and it is very unlikely that Peirce, a careful and thorough thinker, 
was not aware of this. Therefore, while the suggestion is plausible, whether Peirce read Cri-
tique of Judgment carefully enough or was acquainted with its main ideas only through the 
Romantics, this lack of attention to aesthetics might also have some other reasons.  
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Of course, the very first formulation of the maxim of pragmatism in “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear” appears to be a solution alternative to that of Kant: the meaning of a concept 
consists in nothing else but the sum total of conceivable practical results of actions one is 
prepared to undertake in case he believes that the concept would hold good in such and 
such particular circumstances. If so, belief really is consistently interpretable as both an in-
telligible object and something that can “truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires” 
(W3: 247) – without the necessity to appeal to the mediating power of aesthetic judgment. 
Knowledge, in this case, comes out to be grounded in social practices and cannot be epis-
temologically approached as a context-free synthesis of ideas.  
But if the maxim is a solution, and if Peirce, an admirer of Kant by his own admission, 
successfully reformulates the Kantian problem without resort to any detailed analysis of the 
Critique of Judgment, it might be worth trying to trace some of Peirce’s early writings for a 
possible explanation. The reasons of this disregard may become somewhat clearer if we 
keep in mind the mediating role pure reflective judgment plays in Kant’s critical philosophy 
together with some points of intersection and compositional concordances between some of 
Peirce’s early writings and Kant’s first two Critiques, to be presented below. 
II. 
For the sake of further analysis, a brief outline of three Kantian critical arguments is in 
order. The arguments may be presented as the next-to-last, prior to Hegel step towards the 
conclusion of the classical rationalist tradition. This step took the form of three Critiques 
conceived as consecutive systematic attempts at bridging rationalist and empiricist ex-
tremes in interpretation of three human faculties: the faculty of knowledge, the faculty of 
desire, and the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain (Deleuze 1984). When know-
ledge, desire and feeling fully depend on experience, they appear in their lower forms, i.e. 
judgments pertaining to them are defined as only a posteriori and presupposing neither un-
iversality nor necessity. On the rationalist side, then, this raises the principal question as to 
whether – and how – each of these faculties “is capable of a higher form … when it finds in 
itself the law of its own exercise” (Deleuze 1984: 4). In other words, the question is how 
knowledge, desire and feeling taken as the results of a priori syntheses may be independent 
of experience (may not be derived from experience), given that they are applicable only to 
the objects of experience. To answer this question, Kant further introduces the notions of 
understanding, reason and imagination which play different roles in analysis of the facul-
ties. Depending on various interrelations between these three within each of the faculties, 
Kant presents logical, ethical and aesthetical sides of his critical approach. 
Unlike Descartes in his Meditations, a generic version of rationalist metaphysics, Kant 
treats knowledge not as an immediate and infallible translation of relations between things 
“out there” in the world into certain states of one’s soul, but as the result of category-con-
strained observation: understanding reduces the synthesis of perceptions to concepts that 
provide knowledge. Both thinking and existence presuppose unifying forms. The corres-
ponding sections of the Transcendental Aesthetics and the Transcendental Analytic intro-
duce two forms of representation: time and space as two forms of intuition, on the one 
hand, and categories of the understanding, on the other hand. It is the application of the two 
forms to one another that makes the process of knowledge possible. However, Kant adds 
another, third dimension to this dyadic relationship: the possibility of bringing the forms of 
representation together requires that there is something connecting categories, on the one 
hand, and phenomena, on the other, i.e. something that shares both the intellectual and the 
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phenomenal nature. It appears, then, that understanding provides the unity of the manifold 
of experience in space and time by appealing to some third, intermediate structure. This in-
termediate structure Kant calls the “transcendental scheme”, which – and this is an ex-
tremely important point of the 1st Critique (in its 2nd edition) – is always a product of the 
imagination, or something that, in Peirce’s terms, we conceive to be such and such. It is nei-
ther a percept, nor a concept, but something that, for Kant, interprets one into the other, as it 
is “homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appear-
ance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible” (KRV: B 
177). It might be noteworthy, though, that Peirce refers to Kantian transcendental schemat-
ism in its 1st edition version, as “a determination of intuition by a concept through the re-
productive imagination” (CP 5.531). John Kaag notes that in this definition “Kant offers us 
a moment of continuity that appears almost Peircean. It reflects an odd departure from the 
dualistic logic that grounds most of the Kantian corpus” (Kaag 2005: 520). 
However, firstly, in Kant, the fact of the logical unity between the two remains a mys-
tery and thus leaves a conceptual gap within the 1st Critique, the gap which is filled by the 
notion of the transcendental scheme. Kant simply postulates the synthesis of impressions 
and doesn’t ask how it is accomplished, i.e. what are the consecutive steps of this accom-
plishment: 
This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere 
form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity na-
ture is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze (KRV: B 
180). 
Secondly, a parallel gap appears in the 2nd Critique as the ethical problem of discontinu-
ity between rational understanding and practical manipulation. These two – the rational un-
derstanding and the practical manipulation – unambiguously refer to the categories of un-
derstanding and the forms of intuition, this time taken as forms of activity. The controversy 
between the 1st Critique and the 2nd Critique is known as the classical problem of the moral 
value of knowledge. This, in turn, forms the central point of Kant’s 3rd Critique – the prob-
lem of the mediating power of aesthetic judgment to somehow reconcile the opposing ex-
tremes. How is this reconciliation accomplished? 
It is important to note that, for Kant, the intelligibility of morality (just like, in terms of 
the 1st Critique, the applicability of categories to phenomena) depends on a difference be-
tween the potential and the real. Kant lays special stress on the fact that the world of nature 
is only a possibility that becomes real through human action. Although, presumably, this 
Kantian thesis is one of the principal fermenting elements of Peirce’s early pragmatism, for 
Kant it is only to the effect that there is a third gap, the one between the theoretical “Self of 
nature” and the practical “Self of freedom”. This latter difference, according to Kant, is in-
herent to moral consciousness, which seeks to reconcile the two in the imaginative reinter-
pretation of the schematism of understanding in aesthetic judgment, i.e. aesthetic or symbol-
ic experience of freedom (KU, §59). What does Kant understand by “symbol” and just how 
does it help to solve the problem?  
On the one hand, Kant says, a rational agent may know how he ought to act, but goes no 
further – he doesn’t know to what purpose he knows this, i.e. what the practical meaning of 
this knowledge is. The categorical imperative, i.e. the regulative principle that rules my de-
sires and my conduct, gives the idea of freedom as a form for an outward action, while si-
multaneously expressing inward necessity. A practical agent, however, is able to think of 
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his own maxims as practical moral laws only if these latter involve purely formal founda-
tion of will: these laws are abstracted from all sorts of subject-matter of the will, in favor of 
their universal form. Therefore, in terms of ethics, freedom is not given to human con-
sciousness “as it is”, but only as a regulative principle, and its meaning is not accessible to 
any individual reasoning: the necessity of categorical imperative in Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy remains inscrutable. One cannot come to the idea of freedom through expe-
rience either, since in experience he has only the law that can be applied to phenomena, the 
law for the functioning of nature.  
Again, the key problem is that Kant does not explain how to proceed from belief to ac-
tion – for the reason that knowledge of a law as such does not constitute any action-guiding 
competence, i.e. does not prevent a practical agent from behavior that may well contradict 
such knowledge. There is only one person, according to Kant, who can see this picture dif-
ferently (or, better say, vice versa): it is a genius, i.e. someone who does not obey the 
scheme, but changes it, and, if necessary, creates it anew. However, in terms of the 3rd Cri-
tique, the law of aesthetic judgment cannot be interpreted by an individual consciousness: 
one cannot rationalize why this particular something appears beautiful to him. Meantime, 
although no one is able to live in an aesthetically deficient world, the changes one makes as 
aesthetic creature always conform to the law that one cannot formalize. 
Accordingly, just like 1st and 2nd Critiques reveal two ways to represent belief – as an 
intelligible object and a source for action, respectively – 2nd and 3rd Critiques form two se-
ries of argument which do not exist separately and always refer to one another: aware of the 
categorical imperative, I cannot work it into a finite set of practical habits; and conversely, 
not aware of the law of aesthetic judgment, I always have an idea of how to rearrange my 
setting. In short, Kant offers an interpretation of the logically structured knowledge into the 
ethically sound conduct by a symbol – a form of possibility, or an aesthetic idea, serving as 
a means of the moral Self’s self-objectifying. It is the power of aesthetic judgment, Kant 
says, that provides the possibility to correlate an object of freedom with an object of nature, 
thus rendering the world surrounding us a symbol of the moral, i.e. something that converts 
my “not understanding why” into symbolic experience of freedom.  
Thus, it is Critique of Judgment that is undoubtedly the focal point of Kantian philoso-
phy. It shows that the moral experience cannot be given as such without a medium, but can 
be rendered efficient (i.e. can be conceived as a rule which is able to guide conduct) by be-
ing symbolized in twofold logic-aesthetical form. On the one hand, ethical behavior is dis-
crete; it cannot be immediately conceived as continuous experience (no one can consistent-
ly and continuously adjust his behavior to a formal rule). On the other hand, ethical beha-
vior cannot acquire any particular practical meaning, but borrows from aesthetics the idea 
of the general law, which is to obey without asking any “why”. 
So far we have witnessed the pervasive interdependence and symmetry of the steps tak-
en by Kant in dealing with logical and ethical parts of his doctrine, that is, in his 1st and 2nd 
Critiques. Peirce, as will be shown, takes this symmetry into account, although only up to a 
certain point and with the proviso as to the role aesthetic experience plays in Kant’s critical 
philosophy. 
III. 
Curiously enough, although Peirce came to clearly formulate the role of the three nor-
mative sciences only towards the end of his life, his scattered notes referring to different 
sections of Kant’s Critiques can be traced back as far as 1857 through1859: 
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The essential of a thing – the character of it – is the unity of the manifold therein con-
tained. Id est, the logical principle, from which as major premises the facts thereof can be 
deduced. What are called a man’s principles however are only certain beliefs of his that 
he may or may not carry out. They therefore do not compose his character, but the general 
expression of the facts – the acts of his soul – does. … (MS 5: XXXVII). 
It is impossible for a man to act contrary to his character. It is foolish for him to try to do 
it; he would be no better man for doing it since the character makes a man. The Very Law 
of the Growth of Character is contained in the character. …. (MS 5: XXXVI). 
When a man begins to be hard pressed with his own passion and power, he sees the non-
sense of guiding his conduct by any rule of God or man and the necessity there is of ex-
cogitating a manner of life of his own (MS 5: LVII). 
Although this exemplar succession of fragments from Peirce’s early diary, chosen out of 
many others, does not in any way represent thorough conceptual analysis, to a careful read-
er of Kant it may give a fairly good idea of Peirce’s early thoughts as inspired by his study-
ing of Kant’s 1st and 2nd Critiques together with Schiller and other Romantics.  
In particular, the first of these early fragments unambiguously refers to that section of 
the “Transcendental Analytic” where Kant explains his notion of the synthetical unity of the 
manifold in intuition. (The next paragraph of this same section discusses the set of basic 
conceptions of this synthetical unity, i.e. Kant’s “Table of the Categories” – the primary 
subject of Peirce’s “On a New List of Categories” eight years later.) Translated into Kan-
tian language, this short note says that whereas the synthesis of the manifold in intuition 
(i.e. the application of categories to phenomena) is logically non-problematic, the applica-
tion of beliefs to possible conduct isn’t. It also might be important to add that this Peirce’s 
early use of belief here differs from Bain’s famous definition as “that upon which a man is 
prepared to act” and instead refers to the Kantian notion of “pragmatic belief”, which a man 
“may or may not carry out”, depending not on any sort of method or experimental results, 
but simply on the issues at stake. Kant’s 1st Critique offers the following definition: 
It often happens that someone propounds his views with such positive and uncompromis-
ing assurance that he seems to have entirely set aside all thought of possible error. A bet 
disconcerts him. Sometimes it turns out that he has a conviction which can be estimated at 
a value of one ducat, but not of ten. For he is very willing to venture one ducat, but when 
it is a question of ten he becomes aware, as he had not previously been, that it may very 
well be that he is in error. If, in a given case, we represent ourselves as staking the happi-
ness of our whole life, the triumphant tone of our judgment is greatly abated; we become 
extremely diffident, and discover for the first time that our belief does not reach so far. 
Thus pragmatic belief always exists in some specific degree, which, according to differ-
ences in the interests at stake, may be large or may be small (KRV: A 825/B 853). 
The remaining two fragments quoted above clearly suggest that by that time Peirce had 
already made his acquaintance with the works of Schiller and other Romantics whose aes-
thetic theories sought to reinterpret Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Although, as it has been 
noted above, remarkably, no explicit references to it can be traced in any of Peirce’s known 
writings, it is to be remembered that it was the Romantics who not only took the Kantian 
conception of aesthetic judgment to its limits, but also emphasized the role of a genius – a 
man, who, as 19-year-old Peirce writes somewhat grandiloquently, “begins to be hard 
pressed with his own passion and power” and finally “sees the nonsense of guiding his con-
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duct by any rule of God or man” and “the necessity … of excogitating a manner of life of 
his own”. The main idea of Kant’s 3rd Critique, to which Peirce presumably alludes in these 
as well as some other early diary notes, appeals to experience that is beyond the scope of 
both theoretical knowledge and practical decisions – two focal themes in Kant’s first two 
Critiques. Kantian pure reflective judgment brings knowledge and moral conduct together, 
and in doing so, it relies neither on practical nor on theoretical pre-existent rules, but 
creates them anew. Due to the activity of the Kantian “productive imagination”, it neither 
prescribes any particular norms of conduct, nor provides any discursive knowledge, but, 
nevertheless, always takes the form of universally significant evaluation.  
It is also remarkable that much later, after a long period during which Peirce wrote next 
to nothing on aesthetics, in his mature pragmatism aesthetic judgment changes its role sub-
stantially, but retains some of its important characteristics as described by Kant. Aesthetic 
judgments are warranted by the objectivity of ultimate ends and, as Hookway describes 
Peirce’s position, “in endorsing them we speak with a universal voice and demand the 
agreement of all rational agents. Although our belief that others will share these standards is 
not simply the product of an empirical induction, our claim to be autonomous rational 
agents controlling our own deliberations stands or falls with our right to speak with a uni-
versal voice about the acceptability of ultimate ends” (Hookway 1985, 62; emphasis 
added). On the one hand, just like in Kant’s case, aesthetics, as a science of admirable per 
se, plays in Peirce’s architectonics the role of a keystone: it makes his architectonics com-
plete. But, on the other hand, it cannot, as it is, provide any justification or guarantee for a 
choice of an end. Peirce, therefore, unlike Kant, holds that the universal validity of such end 
remains only a matter of rational hope. Thus, Peirce agrees with Kant on the role of aesthet-
ics, but not on the way it can be shown that the ends it provides are objectively valid. Ac-
cording to Peirce, the proper goal, in the case of aesthetics, is “to understand how standards 
adopted without justification can have objective validity, to explain how we can reasonably 
hold that the standards we adopt without justification are not psychologically determined 
but hold for all rational agents” (Hookway 1985: 59). According to Kant, aesthetic judg-
ment is justified as a universally valid because it is the only possible symbolic link between 
an object of freedom and an object of nature. However, both for Peirce and for Kant aes-
thetic judgment presupposes a necessary connection between the pleasure I experience and 
the object which causes it–in spite of the fact that the “ought” which this aesthetic necessity 
involves is not based on any particular rule*.  
Back again to Peirce’s early years, from 1857 to 1859 he wrote four short Schiller-
inspired papers: “The Sense of Beauty never furthered the Performance of a Single Act of 
Duty”, “Raphael and Michelangelo compared as men”, “Analysis of Genius”, and “The 
Axioms of Intuition after Kant” (W1: 1857-1866, 10-16, 31-36). These papers, although 
much different in terms of style and intention, implicitly ask one and the same question: If a 
genius, unlike an ordinary man, is the one who, in Kantian terms, has the aesthetic-based 
power to see a given totality of understanding as a law of Reason, what are the results of 
this power with respect to morality? 
In trying to answer this puzzling question, Peirce gradually diverts from the strictly 
Kantian way. In his late recollections Peirce himself more or less precisely defined the 
timeframe of this diversion: he noted that during the years that passed between 1857, when 
he first met Chauncey Wright, and 1871, when the first meetings of the Metaphysical Club 
presumably were held in Cambridge, his “Kantism got whittled down to small dimensions. 
                                                          
* This might explain why Peirce eventually granted aesthetics the status of a normative science, despite the 
fact that his view on justifiability of aesthetic judgments appears to be somewhat weaker than Kant’s. 
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It was little more than a wire, – an iron wire, however” (MS 317). Shortly before the end of 
this period of time, in 1870 Peirce attended at least some of Wright’s lectures on the psy-
chology of Alexander Bain at Harvard. It is in these lectures, among other things, Wright 
gave an account of Bain’s famous definition of belief – which was later in Peirce’s writings 
to take the place of the purely Kantian notion of pragmatic belief, the extended definition of 
which is quoted above. This may be read to mean that it is at some time toward the end of 
this period (i.e. during the few years prior to the founding of the Metaphysical Club) that 
Peirce’s views finally shifted away from the mainstream of Kantian thought – while pre-
serving its principal framework and the acute attention Kant paid to the paradoxes of the 
practical Reason and intricate relationship between three normative sciences. 
IV. 
Peirce’s earliest noticeable breakaway from Kant’s logic is clearly shown in the com-
parison between the following well-known paragraphs from Kant’s “Transcendental Ana-
lytic” and Peirce’s “New List of Categories”, which are important for our further analysis: 
(Kant): For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in 
itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, 
not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in 
so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of 
them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to my self the identity of the conscious-
ness in [i.e. throughout] these representations. In other words, the analytic unity of ap-
perception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity. The 
thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, is therefore 
equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so 
unite them; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the 
representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so 
far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them 
one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I 
have representations of which I am conscious to myself (KRV: B133; emphasis added). 
(Peirce): If we had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to unity, and 
would therefore not need to be thought of as referred to an interpretant, and the concep-
tion of reference to an interpretant would not arise. But since there is a manifold of im-
pressions, we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which leads us to differentiate 
this impression from that, and then, having been differentiated, they require to be brought 
to unity. Now they are not brought to unity until we conceive them together as being ours, 
that is, until we refer them to a conception as their interpretant. Thus, the reference to an 
interpretant arises upon the holding together of diverse impressions, and therefore it does 
not join a conception to the substance, as the other two references do, but unites directly 
the manifold of the substance itself. It is, therefore, the last conception in order in passing 
from being to substance (W2: 1867-1871, 54; emphasis added). 
As these passages indicate, for Kant, self-consciousness implies the notion “I think” that 
must accompany all other notions for them to be comprehensible. In contrast, the Peircean 
pattern of interpreting, unlike self-consciousness, unites all other notions in a general idea 
in that it correlates them to something else in such a way as to give rise to the notion of re-
presentation: I represent something the correlation of which to something else is the only 
VITALY KIRYUSHCHENKO             LOGIC, ETHICS AND AESTHETICS 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
ISSN: 2036-4091                   2011, III, 2 
 269 
 
guarantee of its comprehensiveness. The continuous act of correlation necessarily refers 
any given expression to its future conceived interpretations. Peirce’s “interpretant” grasps a 
multitude of impressions in an immediately perceived totality. It is a general term that, in 
bringing a multitude of experience to unity, doesn’t add any other concept to it, and, at the 
same time, makes the flow of experience continuous. While Kantian conceptual synthesis is 
simply postulated, in Peirce’s “New List” it acquires cognitive value only as a result of the 
process of interpretation.  
In displaying his notion of interpretant, Peirce presumably refers to the 2nd chapter of 
“The Analytics of Concepts” (and to §24 “The Application of the Categories to Objects of 
the Senses in General” in particular), and “The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Under-
standing” (Chapter I of the “Analytic of Principles”), where special emphasis is put on the 
spontaneous, or “productive” role of the imagination. Reinterpreting these sections, Peirce 
makes the possibility of knowledge dependent on the synthesis of impressions taken as a 
process explicable in its principle details. The synthesis is described not as an “art con-
cealed in the depths of the human soul”, but as a continuous act of correlation which neces-
sarily addresses any given expression to its possible interpretation. It acquires cognitive 
value through a set of modes of reference – quality, relation and representation, and their 
corresponding kinds of signification: likenesses, indices and general signs, or symbols. 
These forms of mediating reference constitute consecutive steps to cover a logical distance 
between the multitude of impressions and a concept. And the last mediating reference em-
bodied in an interpretant “does not join a conception to the substance, as the other two ref-
erences do, but unites directly the manifold of the substance itself” (W2: 54). The interpre-
tant simply allows us to grasp the impressions as ours, thus replacing Kantian synthesis of 
apperception in self-consciousness with the idea of an intersubjective synthesis of meaning 
(Apel 1980: Ch. III.)*.  
Thus, in his “On a New List of Categories” Peirce at first asks the Hegelian question of 
how the synthesis is accomplished. Like Hegel, Peirce interprets Kantian synthesis not as a 
pure self-positing (Selbst-Bestimmung), but as a process of interpretation, or continuous de-
velopment. Logic, for him, can rely upon neither radical skepticism (Cartesian thought-
experiment) nor some established epistemology (Kant’s transcendental deduction of catego-
ries), because logic’s principal problem lays not so much in clarifying the character or 
modes of being, but rather in semiotically approached functional features of its representa-
tion. In fact, for Peirce, being is representing. 
Admittedly, describing Peirce’s early analysis of Kant as strictly Hegelian is, of course, 
problematic. Peirce’s attitude towards Hegel was in many ways contradictory, and oscil-
lated between severe criticism and general acceptance. For example, on the one hand, in “A 
Guess at the Riddle”, Peirce writes: “My whole method will be found to be in profound 
contrast with that of Hegel; I reject his philosophy in toto” (W6: 1886-1890, 179). On the 
other hand, in an unnamed manuscript written in the same year, we read: 
                                                          
* The analysis of Peirce’s idea of interpretant, which plays crucial role in his theory of signs throughout all 
stages of its development, has a longstanding history in Peirce studies, and of course there are numerous other in-
terpretations of it: for example, the general account of it (Short 2007, Lalor 1997); its examination in relation to 
the notions of causation (Hulswit 2002), subjectivity (Colapietro 1989), information (De Tienne 2005), translation 
(Liszka 1990, Savan 1988), etc. It is also important to remember that, as Peirce gradually moved away from the 
mainstream of Kant’s Critiques, he made numerous modifications to the idea of interpretant, which cannot be 
taken into account here. As the present paper deals only with the earliest version of it, which was a direct result of 
Peirce’s reinterpretation of the Kantian table of categories, the approach most pertinent to our purposes is the one 
represented in Apel 1980. 
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Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief topic the importance 
of continuity, which was the very idea the mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly 
engaged in following out for three centuries. This made Hegel’s work less correct and ex-
cellent in itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of affinity 
with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had been chiefly laid up.… My 
philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume (CP 1.41-42). 
And again, in one of his letters to Edward Holden Peirce writes about possible advan-
tages of his evolutionist metaphysics for “philosophers and Hegelians (sic)” (L 200, CSP-
EH, 20.08.86). However, in spite of this, by the time of “New List”, in 1867, Peirce and 
Hegel, regarding this particular Kantian problem, are en rapport in the main: whereas Kant 
considers the unity of being and substance as an analytical fact, both Peirce’s “New List” 
and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit treat it as some sort of “logical adventure” in which 
the result is not guaranteed from the start at all. Moreover, in both cases this unity unders-
tood as a process inevitably refers to some regulative idea (Hegel’s “spiritual community” 
and Peirce’s community of researchers). And the synthesis may be accomplished only pro-
vided it is addressed to this idea at every step.  
V. 
In 1877–1878 Peirce published his second series of articles, known as “Illustrations of 
the Logic of Science” this time in Appleton’s Popular Science Monthly. The first two of 
them, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, are commonly taken 
to be based upon a nameless paper read by Peirce before the Metaphysical Club in Novem-
ber 1872, just about the time Peirce’s Kantism “got whittled down to small dimensions” 
(MS 317). Moreover, “The Fixation of Belief”, apart from the fact that it includes prelimi-
nary notes to what in the next article of the series would appear as the maxim of pragmat-
ism, is also very remarkable on account of its composition. Namely, as in the case of the 
Kantian transition from the 1st Critique to the 2nd, it presents the argument that seems to 
give consistent pragmatic reinterpretation of all the logical steps made by Peirce in his 
“New List” ten years earlier.  
Peirce’s “New List” rests on the assumption that there’s a logical space, or, rather, logi-
cally significant distance between being and substance, i.e., the conceptual space to be 
filled in order to make sense of the question “what is … this?”. This logically significant 
distance is covered by a set of consecutive media – quality, relation, and representation – 
that are needed to get the process of interpretation started. To summarize the discussed 
above, an interpretant, the last general term in the sequence, performs several crucial inter-
connected functions: (1) it makes us conceive the impressions together as being ours and, 
thereby (2) allows us to grasp the multitude of impressions in a totality of a concept. Fur-
ther, (3) it addresses a given expression to its further interpretation, thus (4) justifying the 
continuity of interpretation. Finally, unlike the preceding two, (5) it does not add any con-
cept to the multitude of impressions, but unites the manifold directly. Thus, the notion of 
interpretant embodied Peirce’s early semiotic intuitions, namely, his first elaborate juxtapo-
sition of the notions of continuity and generality, along with the idea of any expression ad-
dressed to future interpretations conceived as ours. These early intuitions inspired by Kan-
tian table of categories proved to be of crucial importance in the developments of Peirce’s 
theory which followed immediately after his “New List”. In particular, the intricate and ex-
tremely rich conceptual amalgam brought forth by Peirce in his notion of interpretant al-
ready contained the germ of his regulative idea of a community of inquirers, the regulative 
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future us which any interpretation guided by the right method is inevitably aimed at – the 
idea which was introduced by Peirce in his 1868 paper “Some Consequences of Four Inca-
pacities” a year after Peirce presented his “New List” to the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (see also Apel 1980: ch. III). 
Back to Peirce’s “Illustrations”, it is our abduction that “The Fixation of Belief”, the 
first paper in the series, may be understood in a manner similar to that of “New List”, 
namely, as resting on the assumption that there is a practically significant distance between 
“believing something” and “believing something that would be true in the long run”. This 
practical distance can only be passed by fixing our belief in one way or another. So, like in 
the case of Kantian “pragmatic belief”, the difference has degrees. The role of consecutive 
media here is played by four different methods, those of tenacity, authority, a priori, and 
practical science that are needed to make this distance epistemologically irrelevant.  
Now there’s no direct indication to such a distinction in the text of the paper. Moreover, 
in the very beginning of “The Fixation of Belief”, before setting about to describe the me-
thods Peirce makes an important stipulation, namely, that fixing beliefs does not presup-
pose any epistemologically legitimate difference between “believing something” and “be-
lieving something is true”: 
The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is 
certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to 
satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not 
seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a 
doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with 
the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opin-
ion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, 
but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a 
firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. … The 
most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But 
we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so 
(W3: 1872-1878, 247-248). 
Meanwhile, in spite of the pronounced tautology, by the end of the paper Peirce charac-
terizes the scientific method as “the only one of the four methods which presents any dis-
tinction of a right and a wrong way” (W3: 1872-1878, 254; emphasis added). Thus, on the 
one hand, it seems redundant to assert the truth of one’s belief as far as it successfully 
guides his actions so as to satisfy his desires. And as far as there are different sorts of social 
practices that yield appropriate methods of reaching firm beliefs, one may choose the me-
thod which would bring the satisfaction. On the other hand, the method of science, unlike 
the other three, is able to present a “distinction of a right and a wrong way”. There must be, 
then, a solid criterion which makes the method of science more preferable in this respect. 
The criterion is this: 
To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which 
our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by 
something upon which our thinking has no effect. … Our external permanency would not 
be external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be 
something which affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these affections are 
necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the 
ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same (W3: 1872-1878, 253). 
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It has been admitted that Peirce’s use of the word “external” in this passage is ambigu-
ous: Peirce refers to “real things whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions 
about them” (W3: 1872-1878, 254), but at first does not give any clear arguments as to 
whether those things shall be considered as anything different from Kantian-like things-in-
themselves (Short 2007: 46-48). Moreover, Peirce’s notion of external permanency as 
“something upon which our thinking has no effect” may be read as a terminological allu-
sion to the concept of “something permanent” (etwas Beharrliches) which occurs in the end 
of Kant’s “Analytic of Principles”. Kant needs it for the refutation of Descartes’ problem-
atic idealism according to which the reality of things outside me is ultimately indemonstra-
ble, the only ultimately irrevocable claim being that “I am”. Kant uses this concept to show 
that, as far as there’s nothing permanent in self-perception (I always think of myself as a 
subject, while I can experience myself only as an immanent object) the very continuity of 
experience, as well as my inner experience as such are necessarily bound up with the exis-
tence of some sort of external permanency (KRV: B 275-276).  
What does “external” mean in this case? The meaning of the word is clarified later in 
“How to Make our Ideas Clear”, the next paper in the series: 
Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investi-
gation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This 
activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained 
goal, is like the operation of destiny. … The opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented 
in this opinion is the real (W3: 1872-1878, 273). 
Thus, the truth of a belief now receives a special definition which is absent in the case 
of the other methods. Namely, it is now defined as the ultimate agreement of “all who in-
vestigate”. Moreover, in the case of scientific method, Peirce lays special stress on the fixa-
tion as a result of a progressive process carried out by some force outside individual minds.  
Further, right after the quoted passage Peirce explains how the idea of such force is to 
be brought into compliance with his earlier “formal” definition of reality as independent 
from what is ultimately thought of about it: 
… reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I 
or any finite number of men may think about it; and … though the object of the final 
opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not depend on what 
you or I or any man thinks. … Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone 
the settlement of opinion… Yet even that would not change the nature of the belief, which 
alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far… (W3: 1872-1878, 273). 
In “New List”, although all three categories are necessary steps in the process of deduc-
tion, the true connection between the continuity of thought and generality of a concept is 
revealed only in the reference to an interpretant. Likewise, in “The Fixation of Belief”, each 
method of fixing beliefs is a necessary step in understanding the advantages of scientific 
inquiry. It is only the reference to the scientific method that shows the way to formation of 
general opinions we are fated to obtain in the long run – provided our investigation accord-
ing to this method is carried sufficiently far. While in the first three methods the truth of a 
belief does not involve the ultimate agreement of “all who investigate”, and the dependence 
of things beliefs are about on what the beliefs are is taken uncritically, it is only the proper 
use of the fourth method of fixing beliefs that makes this dependence to be a matter of fact, 
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thus representing truth and reality as coordinate concepts – with their practical synthesis 
gradually achieved in the process of inquiry. So, what we allegedly have here is a practical 
synthesis analogous to the logical one displayed in the “New List”. Now let us turn to the 
structural concordance between “On a New List of Categories” and “The Fixation of Be-
lief” in some further detail. 
The method of tenacity is applied when a man holds a self-satisfied opinion so that “the 
pleasure he derives from his calm faith overbalances any inconveniencies resulting from its 
deceptive character” (W3: 1872-1878, 249). At this first step any belief is nothing more 
than a quality in itself. For, like a self-satisfied and self-contained opinion held by an indi-
vidual, a quality, which Peirce himself compared with the Kantian “manifold in intuition”, 
or, with reservations, with Hegelian “sense-certainty” (Stern 2005: 67) is, 
…an instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or 
any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which one stretch 
of consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its own positive quality which 
consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may have been 
brought about; so that if this feeling is present during a lapse of time, it is wholly and 
equally present at every moment of that time. To reduce this description to a simple defi-
nition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of conscious-
ness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else (CP 1.306). 
Tenacity, intellectual inelasticity is a feature of any individual mind as far as it is consi-
dered as it is in itself “regardless of anything else” and presupposing no distinction or com-
parison; it amounts to an immediate experience of a self-satisfactory feeling of assurance, a 
kind of Hegelian die sinnliche Gewissheit, a naïve and immediate unity of subject and ob-
ject, an abstraction of “here and now”.  
The second method represents an opinion enforced by certain authority, be it an indi-
vidual or some sort of institution. Here belief is in the form of action-reaction or, in Hege-
lian terms, “negative unity”, and is therefore of relational character: 
This conception, that another man’s thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one’s own, 
is a distinctly new step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in 
man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make 
ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each other’s opinions (W3: 1872-1878, 
250). 
So it appears that the collision between the social and a blind tenacity in following some 
belief gives rise to a first objectified form of rationality for an individual – an idea of a law 
as a general expression for a set of opinions held by a certain social group “here and now”. 
Here opinion cannot be considered in itself anymore and is confronted by another opinion 
with which it enters in a certain relation. The immediacy of tenacity is replaced by a direct 
experience of the other.  
However, sooner or later in any given society, Peirce says, “some individuals will be 
found who … possess a wider sort of social feeling” (W3: 1872-1878, 252; emphasis 
added). This wider social feeling allows them to see most of such laws as historical acci-
dents, products of mere social design or public opinion manipulation. They propose the new 
a priori method which excludes the possibility for a belief to depend on the idiosyncratic 
whim of an individual or a law-like power of society: it predetermines the choice of opinion 
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bringing it, as philosophers of a priori themselves believe, into harmony with natural caus-
es. 
Indeed, every man, according to Peirce, is a truth-seeker by nature – simply because, 
even in the absence of clearly stated reasons, at every moment of his life he cannot help 
making a choice. And in doing so, he inevitably changes the natural balance of probabili-
ties. Science in its pragmatist understanding, as the source of the next and final method in 
the list, is nothing other than an extension of this natural disposition, or a more logically 
complex and sophisticated expression of it. Naturally, anybody may accept false premises 
and come to false conclusions. Science does not offer a way to get rid of this problem in 
any given “here and now”, but merely offers a mode of action, a method which ascribes 
practical meaning to our natural inclination towards making right decisions.  
The method of science is seen by Peirce as a correction of the a priori method by apply-
ing it to experience, so they together may be taken to form the third and last step in the 
process. In the use of scientific method reality is no longer determined by individual will, 
social contract, or a priori rules. Moreover, compared with the other three this method has 
one feature that is peculiar to it. It is such that any decision made on the basis of its logic is 
immediately connected with an ethical choice. For Peirce, it is by following this method 
that logic reveals itself as the ethics of intellect, and ethics as the logic of conduct. 
Thus, in Peirce’s “New List”, the interpretant brings the multitude of impressions to 
unity because, unlike quality and relation, it does not add any new concept to the multitude, 
but simply allows us to grasp the impressions as ours. Likewise, the method of science is a 
final step in coordinating “believing something” with “believing something that would be 
true in the long run” because, unlike other methods, it makes an opinion independent of any 
considerations that rely upon personal advantages or disadvantages of holding it. Other-
wise, a person who, in using the scientific method, confesses that there is such a thing as 
truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on 
full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and then, though con-
vinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind in-
deed. (W3: 1872-1878, 257) 
An interpretant unites my diverse impressions not by joining any other concept to the 
diversity, but by appealing to its further interpretation by another interpretant. Likewise, in 
Peirce’s maxim certain conceivable practical results of actions and perceptions are united 
into a concept, where “the test of whether I am truly following the method is not an imme-
diate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the applica-
tion of the method” (W3: 1872-1878, 255). 
Peirce thus deliberately preserves the structure of Kantian argumentation which shows 
structural unity of logical and practical problems, while filling the aforementioned gaps in 
Kant’s theory. From 1867, the year of “On a New List of Categories”, to 1877, the year of 
“The Fixation of Belief”, Peirce makes an important move similar to that which Kant made 
from the 1st Critique to the 2nd.  
In making this conclusion, we by no means wish to suggest that “The Fixation of Be-
lief” contains any sort of ethical doctrine. On the contrary, in concluding paragraphs of it 
Peirce concedes that the first three methods of fixing beliefs have their merits and advan-
tages and he is careful enough not to claim unquestionable ethical superiority of scientific 
method over them: practical consequences are not necessarily moral ones (W3: 1872-1878, 
255-257). However, it is perfectly justifiable to say that it is this paper that displays Peirce’s 
decisive move from questions of logical representation to those of practical agency. And it 
is quite remarkable that this move was marked by the compositional symmetry between 
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Peirce’s solutions in the two papers in question, which symmetry has its analogy in Kant’s 
critical arguments. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it offers a plausible answer to the question of why 
the early Peirce, an admirer of Kant, reformulates Kant’s view on the relationship between 
logic and ethics without any reference to aesthetic judgment. Kant represents the logical 
and the ethical sides of his architectonics as a static self-positing. In case of pure reason, the 
schematism of the understanding is described as “an art concealed in the depths of the hu-
man soul”; in case of practical reason, there’s a problem of how, taken as a general faculty, 
it gives determinate answers as to what to do in concrete situations, if all it can offer is the 
universal law grounded in the purely formal foundation of will. As a result, the gap between 
the theoretical and the practical is bridged by aesthetic judgment. Peirce reinterprets Kan-
tian syntheses as processes of continuous development, which makes it possible for the 
theoretical and the practical to be consistently interpreted into one another without the 
resort to aesthetic mediation. He incorporates aesthetics only much later, in order to provide 
a missing link between his normative theory, his evolutionary metaphysics, and his doctrine 
of categories. Thus, it appears that Peirce ignored aesthetics at the early period of his career 
when Kantian influence on his thought was very strong. And vice versa, he finally ac-
knowledged the role of aesthetics and laid the decisive emphasis on the Kantian idea of ar-
chitectonics, with the problem of normativity as its starting point, at the time when, as he 
himself claims, he was as far from Kant as he possibly could.  
As it has already been mentioned above, Peirce’s move from logical representation to 
practical agency happened during the few years prior to the founding of the Metaphysical 
Club in Cambridge and shortly after Peirce attended Wright’s lectures on the psychology of 
Alexander Bain at Harvard, during which Wright gave an account of Bain’s famous defini-
tion of belief. Max H. Fisch specifies this Peirce’s move, starting from Peirce’s 1868 Jour-
nal of Speculative Philosophy series, as a transition from “the pre-Bain theory” to “the post-
Bain theory”: 
It is evident that Peirce was already acquainted with Bain’s theory of belief in 1868 … but 
he neither develops nor applies it, and there is no trace of pragmatism. On the other hand, 
the most conspicuous doctrine of the pre-Bain theory, that all thought is in signs, is not 
asserted in the post-Bain theory; but it is assumed throughout. … There is, however, a 
crucial difference between the two theories at this point. According to the pre-Bain the-
ory, every thought interprets a previous thought and is interpreted by a subsequent 
thought; that is, every sign translates another and is in turn translated by still another. Ac-
cording to the post-Bain theory, the cognitive process has context, direction and purpose. 
Thought arises in one set of circumstances and terminates in another. It starts from a 
doubt and ends in a belief, the essence of which is a habit or rule of action. In the pre-Bain 
theory, thought is identified with cognition; in the post-Bain theory, it is identified with 
inquiry. In place of the continuity and ubiquity of the cognitive ‘process, we have the 
analysis of the cyclic belief-doubt-inquiry-belief continuum which is Peirce’s restatement 
of Bain’s doctrine of belief, and it is out of this analysis that the pragmatic maxim is 
drawn (Fisch 1986: 97-98). 
According to Fisch, these differences and similarities raise the question of whether 
Peirce himself drew any clear distinction between the two theories and how exactly the 
transition took place, given that: 
In the course in logic which Peirce taught at the John Hopkins University in the years 
immediately following the publication of his Popular Science Monthly series, he began 
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with the topic, “The Psychological and Metaphysical facts upon which the possibility of 
Logic rests”, and the texts for this topic were the three Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
articles developing his pre-Bain theory of cognition, and the first two of the Popular Sci-
ence Monthly articles developing his post-Bain theory (Fisch 1986: 100). 
As to the second part of the question (how exactly the transition took place), again, if 
the foregoing analysis is correct, Peirce chose a sophisticated compositional decision, 
which provided a continuous link between the theoretical and the practical, leaving aesthet-
ics, as the third, meditational element out of the picture. Of course, he also might well real-
ize that the binary character is revealed in aesthetic judgment itself. The intriguing fact is 
that this was, although in a vague and undeveloped form, already anticipated by Peirce at 
the time he read Schiller’s Aesthetische Briefe in 1857: 
Now it will be observed that beauty gives the mind no particular direction or tendency – 
hence it can have no result either for the intellect or the will, and can help us to perform 
no single duty. On the other hand, it places the mind in a state of “infinite determinable-
ness” so that it can turn in any direction and is in perfect freedom; hence, beauty is in the 
highest degree fruitful with respect to knowledge and morality (W1: 1857-1866, 11-12). 
However, although later on Peirce carefully remastered the role aesthetic judgment 
played in Kant’s theory and incorporated it in his own architectonics, his pragmatism in its 
first formulation provided the means for an important shift. It played a major part in decon-
structing the classical picture of relations between three normative sciences and introduced 
a significant change into Kantian aesthetics-based symbolism. 
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